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Chapter 10 
An Immune-Inspired Approach to Anomaly Detection 
 
 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
Jamie Twycross, University of Nottingham, UK 
Uwe Aickelin, University of Nottingham, UK 
The immune system provides a rich metaphor for computer security: anomaly detection 
that works in nature should work for machines. However, early artificial immune system 
approaches for computer security had only limited success. Arguably, this was due to 
these artificial systems being based on too simplistic a view of the immune system. We 
present here a second generation artificial immune system for process anomaly detection. 
It improves on earlier systems by having different artificial cell types that process 
information. Following detailed information about how to build such second generation 
systems, we find that communication between cells types is key to performance. Through 
realistic testing and validation we show that second generation artificial immune systems 
are capable of anomaly detection beyond generic system policies. The paper concludes 
with a discussion and outline of the next steps in this exciting area of computer security. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
The work discussed here is motivated by a broad interest in biologically-inspired 
approaches to computer security, particularly in immune-inspired approaches to intrusion 
detection. The first part of this chapter gives a brief overview of biologically-inspired 
computing and computer security, and introduces the field of artificial immune systems. 
We have developed an immune-inspired process anomaly detection system. Process 
anomaly detection is an important technique in computer security for detecting a range of 
attacks, and the second part of this chapter introduces and reviews current approaches to 
process anomaly detection, relating our work to other work in this area. The third section 
of  this  chapter  introduces  our  own  efforts  to  develop  a  prototype  immune-inspired 
realtime process anomaly detection system. However, our interests are also wider, and 
address issues concerning how artificial immune systems are modelled and implemented 
in  general.  We  have  implemented  a system,  libtissue,  in which  immune-inspired 
algorithms can be developed and tested on real-world problems. The design and 
implementation of this system is briefly reviewed. The final part of this chapter presents 
and discusses the results of validation tests using libtissue.  A number of datasets 
containing system call and signal information were generated and a simple algorithm was 
implemented to test the libtissue system. The behaviour of the algorithm is analysed 
and it is shown  how  the libtissue system  can be used  to build  immune-inspired 
algorithms that detect anomalies in process behaviour. 
 
BIOLOGICALLY-INSPIRED APPROACHES 
Biological approaches to computer security are appealing for a number of reasons. 
Williamson (2002), discusses some of these reasons and their impact on the design of 
computer   security   systems.   Biological   organisms   have   developed   many   novel, 
parsimonious and effective protection mechanisms. As computer systems and networks 
  
 
become  more  complex  traditional  approaches  are  often  ineffective  and  suffer  from 
problems  such  as  scalability,  and  biologically  systems  are  important  sources  of 
inspiration when designing new approaches. The short position paper of Morel (2002) 
discusses the general design of cyber-security systems that provides a large distributed 
computer network with a high degree of survivability. He proposes that a cyber-security 
system emulates the architecture of the biological immune system. As in this chapter, the 
innate immune system is considered as central to the immune response, processing 
information and controlling the adaptive immune system. An effective cyber-security 
system  should  emulate  key  features,  most  importantly  distributed  control,  of  the 
biological system, it should provide multiple information gathering mechanisms, and it 
should coevolve with the threat. 
In  another  interesting  position  paper  Williams  (1996)  explores  the  similarities 
between people’s  health and the security of complex computer systems. Humans are 
composed of distinct but tightly integrated multilayer systems, have external interfaces 
which can receive a wide range of input and which carefully balance security and 
functionality, and have internal interfaces with protection mechanisms. They are not born 
with many of their defenses but learn to protect themselves against recurring threats such 
as viruses, and are able to identify and develop defenses for new threats. The body is able 
to detect conditions that are likely to lead to injury. It is surrounded by a skin which, if 
damaged, leads to further response. Williams suggests that computer systems also need to 
have  virtual  skins  with  a  similar  functionality.  He  highlights  the  importance  of  the 
balance  between  functionality,  security  and  flexibility.  Humans,  as  with  computer 
systems, live a complex environment where conditions change over time. Both computer 
and biological systems are very sensitive to the input they receive. Biological systems 
check and filter input at many levels and he suggests security systems need to do the 
same. He also emphasises the impossibility of accurate measurement of health in humans, 
which is reflected in the difficultly of measuring the security of computer systems. His 
general view is that the computer security industry is becoming as specialised as the 
healthcare industry, with security engineers akin to doctors. 
Our interest is in immune-inspired  approaches to intrusion detection. The field of 
artificialimmunesystems began in the early 1990s with a number of independent groups 
conducting research which used the biological immune system as inspiration for solutions 
to problems in other domains. There are several general reviews of artificial immune 
system research (Dasgupta, 2006, Hart and Timmis, 2005), and a number of books 
including Dasgupta (1999) and de Castro and Timmis (2002) covering the field. Large 
bibliographies have been collated by Dasgupta and Azeem (2006) (over 600 journal and 
conference  papers)  and  an annual  international  conference  has been held since 2002 
(Proceedings of the International Conference on Artificial Immune Systems, 2002-2007). 
Specifically of relevance to this chapter is the review of artificial immune system 
approaches to intrusion detection by Aickelin et al. (2004). 
Intrusiondetectionsystems are software systems designed to identify and prevent the 
misuse of computer networks and systems. Still a relatively young field, first discussed 
by James  Anderson  in  his  seminal  1980  paper  (Anderson,  1980)  and  with  the  first 
working system described in Dorothy Denning’s 1987 paper (Denning, 1987), intrusion 
detection still faces many unresolved research issues. Many intrusion detection systems 
have been developed, representative samples of which are reviewed in Kemmerer and 
  
 
Vigna (2002) and Venter and Eloff (2003). Several excellent review papers (Axelsson, 
2000,  Bace  and  Mell,  2001)  and  books  (Northcutt  and  Novak,  2003)  on  intrusion 
detection approaches have also been published. There are a number of different ways to 
classify intrusion detection systems (Axelsson, 2000). In their paper, Jansen and 
Karygiannis (1999) discuss the shortcomings of current intrusion detection system 
technology and the advantages of and approaches to applying mobile agents to intrusion 
detection and response. They highlight the issue of false positives as the primary problem 
facing the intrusion detection system community, and this is one of the key issues which 
this chapter seeks to address, particularly in terms of the detection of novel attacks. 
 
PROCESS  ANOMALY DETECTION 
In the classic paper “An Evening with Berferd in which a Cracker is Lured, Endured, and 
Studied” (Cheswick, 1992), Cheswick describes the activities of a cracker who is allowed 
to gain access to a monitored machine. Other more recent publications  (Mitnick and 
Simon, 2005) which have deconstructed real-world attacks have painted a similar picture. 
Often, the initial goal of an attack is to gain administrator privileges or “get root” on a 
machine and so give the attacker free reign on the system. If the attacker does not have an 
account on the system then they may try to exploit a vulnerability in a network service 
running on the target remote machine to gain access. This is termed a remote-to-local 
attack. Buffer overflow exploits are often used to subvert remote services to execute code 
the attacker  supplies  and,  for example,  open  a  remote  command  shell  on  the target 
machine.  Sometimes,  the attacked  service  will already be running with administrator 
privileges, in which case the initial attack is complete. Otherwise, the attacker will have 
access to the machine at the same privilege level as the attacked service is running at. In 
this case, or if the attacker already has a local user account on the target machine, they 
will need to perform a privilege escalation attack, called a user-to-root attack. Often, this 
will   involve   attacking   a   privileged   program,   such   as   a   program   running   with 
administrator privileges, and, once again, subverting its execution to create a command 
shell  with  administrator  privileges.  After  the  initial  goal  of  unrestricted  access  is 
achieved,  the  attacker  may install  rootkits  to  hide  their  presence  and  facilitate  later 
access. Data can be copied to and from the machine, remote services such as filesharing 
daemons can be started, and, in the case of worms, this may all be done automatically 
without human intervention. 
Processanomalydetectionsystems are designed to detect and prevent the subversion of  
processes necessary in such remote-to-local  and user-to-root attacks. A number of 
host-based  intrusion  detection  systems  have  been  built  around  monitoring  running 
processes to detect intrusions, and are discussed in detail in the next section. In general, 
these intrusion  detection  systems  collect information  about a running process from a 
variety of sources, including from log files created by the process, or from other 
information gathered by the operating system. The general idea is that by observing what 
the process is currently doing e.g. by looking at its log files, we can tell whether the 
process is behaving normally or has been subverted by an attack. While log files are an 
obvious starting point for such systems, and are still an important component in a holistic 
security approach, it is fairly easy to execute attacks which do not cause any logging to 
take place, and so evade detection. Because of this, there has been a substantial amount of 
research into other data sources, usually collected by the operating system. Of these, 
  
 
system calls have been the most favoured approach. This section begins with a brief 
background on system calls and then reviews current system call-based approaches to 
process anomaly detection. 
 
Processes and System Calls 
A process is a running instance of a program. On modern multitasking operating systems 
many processes are effectively running simultaneously. For example, a server may be 
running a web server, email servers and a number of other services. A single program 
executable,  when  run, may create  several  child processes  by forking (fork,  2007) or 
threading (pthreads, 2007). For example, web servers typically start child processes to 
handle individual connections once they have been received. The process which created 
the child process is called the parent process. Child processes themselves may create 
children,  sometimes  generating  a  complex  process  tree  derived  from  a single  parent 
process node created when the executable is first run. The operating system is responsible 
for managing  the execution  of running  processes,  and associates  a number,  called  a 
process  identifier,  with  each  process.  This  number  uniquely  identifies  a  process. 
Essentially,  the operating system initialises  a counter and assigns its value to a new 
process, and then increments the counter. When a process is started, the operating system 
associates other metadata with it too, such as the process identifier of the parent process 
that  created  it,  and  the  user  who  started  the  process.  The  process  is  also  allocated 
resources by the operating system. These resources include memory, which stores the 
executable code and data, and file descriptors, which identify files or network sockets 
which belong to the process. 
Systemcalls (syscalls) are a low-level mechanism by which processes request system 
resources such as peripheral I/O or memory allocation from an operating system. As a 
process runs it cannot usually directly access memory or hardware devices. Instead, the 
operating system manages these resources and provides a set of functions, called syscalls, 
which processes can call to access these resources. On modern Linux systems there are 
around 300 syscalls, accessed via wrapper functions in the libc library. Some of the more 
common syscalls are summarised in Table 1.1. At an assembly code level, when a process 
wants to make a syscall it will load the syscall number into the EAX register, and syscall 
arguments into registers such as EBX, ECX or EDX. The process will then raise the 0x80 
interrupt. This causes the process to halt execution and the operating system to execute 
the requested syscall. Once the syscall has been executed, the operating system places a 
return value in EAX and returns execution to the process. Operating systems other than 
Linux differ slightly in these details, for example BSD puts the syscall number in EAX 
and  pushes  the  arguments  onto  the  stack  (Bovet  and  Cesati,  2002,  syscalls,  2007). 
Higher-level languages provide library calls which wrap the syscall in easier-to-use 
functions such as printf. 
 
 
 
 
Table 1.1:  Common system calls (syscalls). 
 
 
number name description 
1 exit terminate process execution 
 
 
2 fork fork a child process 
3 read read data from a file or socket 
4 write write data to a file or socket 
5 open open a file or socket 
6 close close a file or socket 
37 kill send a kill signal 
90 old_mmap map memory 
91 munmap unmap memory 
301 socket create a socket 
303 connect connect a socket 
 
 
 
Syscalls are a much more powerful data source for detecting attacks than log file 
entries.  All  of  a  monitored  application’s  interactions  with  the  network,  filesystem, 
memory, and other hardware devices can be monitored. Most attacks which subvert the 
execution of the monitored application will probably have to access some of these 
resources, and so will have to make a number of syscalls. In other words, it is much 
harder to evade a syscall-based intrusion detection system. However, monitoring syscalls 
is more complex  and costly than reading data from  a log file,  and usually involves 
placing hooks or stubs in the operating system, or wrapping the monitored process in a 
sandbox-like system. This increases the runtime of the monitored process, since for each 
syscall the monitor will spend at least a few clock ticks pushing the data it has collected 
to  a  storage  buffer.  Syscall  interposition  systems,  which,  in  addition  to  passively 
gathering syscall information, also decide whether to permit or deny the syscall, can add 
additional runtime overheads. Also, processes can generate hundreds of syscalls a second, 
making the data load significantly higher. Other factors also need to be taken into account 
when implementing a syscall monitoring or interposition system. Incorrect replication of 
operating system state or other race conditions may allow syscall monitoring to be 
circumvented. These factors are addressed in detail by Garfinkel (2003). 
 
Current Approaches 
The systrace system of Provos (2003) is a syscall-based confinement and intrusion 
detection system for Linux, BSD and OSX systems. A kernel patch inserts various hooks 
into the kernel to intercept syscalls from the monitored process. The user specifies a 
syscall policy which is a whitelist of permitted syscalls and arguments. The monitored 
process is wrapped by a user-space program which compares any syscalls a process tries 
to make (captured by the kernel hooks) with this policy, and only allows the process to 
execute syscalls which are present on the whitelist. Execution of the monitored process is 
halted while this decision is made, which, along with other factors such as the switch 
from kernel- to user-space, adds an overhead to the monitored process. However, due in 
part to the simplicity of the decision-making algorithm (a list search on the policy file), as 
well as a good balance of kernel- versus user-space, this performance impact on average 
is  minimal,   and   systrace has  been   used   to  monitor   processes   in  production 
environments.  As  an  intrusion  detection  system,  systrace can  be  run  to  either 
automatically  deny  and  log  all  syscall  attempts  not  permitted  by  the  policy,  or  to 
graphically prompt a user as to whether to permit or deny the syscall. The latter mode can 
be used to add syscalls to the policy, adjusting it before using it in automatic mode. Initial 
policies  for  a  process  are  obtained  by using  templates  or  by  running  systrace in 
  
 
automatic policy generation  mode.  In this mode, the monitored  process is run under 
normal  usage  conditions  and permit  entries  are created  in the policy file  for all  the 
syscalls made by the process. The policy specification allows some matching of syscall 
arguments as well as syscall numbers. 
Gao et al. (2004) introduce a new model of syscall behaviour called an execution 
graph. An execution graph is a model that accepts approximately the same syscall 
sequences as would a model built on a control flow graph. However, the execution graph 
is constructed from syscalls gathered during normal execution, as opposed to a control 
flow graph which is derived from static analysis. In addition to the syscall number, stack 
return addresses are also gathered and used in construction of the execution graph. The 
authors also introduce a course-grain classification of syscall-based intrusion detection 
systems into white-box, black-box and gray-box approaches. Black-box systems build 
their models from a sample of normal execution using only syscall number and argument 
information. Gray-box approaches, as with black boxes, build their models from a sample 
of normal execution but, as well as using syscall information, also use additional runtime 
information. White-box approaches do not use samples of normal execution, but instead 
use static analysis  techniques  to derive  their models.  A prototype  gray-box  anomaly 
detection system using execution graphs is introduced by the authors, and they compare 
this  approach  to  other  systems  and  discuss  possible  evasion  strategies  in  Gao  et  al. 
(2004). 
Sekar et al. (2001) implement a realtime intrusion detection system which uses finite 
state automata to capture short and long term temporal relationships between syscalls. 
One advantage of using finite state automata is that there is no limit to the length of the 
syscall sequence. Yeung et al. (2003) describe an intrusion detection system which uses a 
discrete hidden Markov model trained using the Baum-Welch re-estimation algorithm to 
detect anomalous  sequences  of syscalls. Lee (2000) explores a similar Markov chain 
model. Krugel et al. (2003) describe a realtime intrusion detection system implemented 
using Snare under Linux. Using syscall audit logs gathered by Snare, their system 
automatically  detects  anomalies  in  syscall  arguments.  They  explore  a  number  of 
statistical models which are learnt from observed normal usage. Endler (1998) presents 
an offline intrusion detection system which examines BSM audit data. They combine a 
multi-layer perceptron neural network which detects anomalies in syscall sequences with 
a histogram classifier which calculates the statistical likelihood of a syscall. Lee and 
Xiang (2001) evaluate the performance of syscall-based anomaly detection models built 
on information-theoretic  measures such as entropy and information cost, and also use 
these models to automatically calculate parameter settings for other models. 
Forrest, Hofmeyr, Somayaji and other researchers at the University of New Mexico 
have  developed  several  immune-inspired  learning-based  approaches.  In  Forrest  et  al. 
(1997) and Hofmeyr and Forrest (2000) a realtime system is evaluated which detects 
anomalous processes by analysing sequences of syscalls. Syscalls generated by an 
application are grouped together into sequences, in this case sequences of six consecutive 
syscalls.  This  choice  of  sequence  length  is discussed  in Tan  and  Maxion  (2003).  A 
database  of  normal  sequences  is  constructed  and  stored  as  a  tree  during  training. 
Sequences  of syscalls are then compared  to this database using a Hamming distance 
metric,  and a sufficient  number  of mismatches  generates  an alert.  No user-definable 
parameters are necessary, and the mismatch threshold is automatically derived from the 
  
 
training  data.  Similar  approaches  have  also  been  applied  by  this  group  to  network 
intrusion detection (Balthrop et al., 2002, Hofmeyr and Forrest, 2000). Somayaji (2002) 
develops the immune-inspired pH intrusion prevention system which detects and actively 
responds to changes in program behaviour in realtime. As with the method just described, 
sequences of syscalls are gathered for all processes running on a host and compared to a 
normal  database  using a similar  immune-inspired  model.  However,  if an anomaly is 
detected, execution of the process that produced the syscalls will be delayed for a period 
of time. This method of response, as opposed to more malign responses such as killing a 
process, is more benign in that if the system makes a mistake and delays a process which 
is behaving normally, this may not have a perceptible impact from the perspective of the 
user. The idea of process homeostasis, with pH maintaining a host machine within certain 
operational limits, is introduced. This approach was effective at automatically preventing 
a number of attacks. 
 
THE libtissue SYSTEM 
The broader aim of the research presented here is to build a software system which 
allows researchers to implement and analyse novel artificial immune system algorithms 
and apply them to real-world problems. We have implemented a prototype of such a 
system,  called   libtissue,  which  is  being  used  by ourselves  and  other  researchers 
(Greensmith et al., 2006a, 2006b, Twycross and Aickelin, 2006) to build and evaluate 
novel immune-inspired  algorithms for process anomaly detection. This section briefly 
reviews the design and implementation of the libtissue system, more detail of which 
can be found in (Twycross and Aickelin, 2006). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.1:  The architecture of libtissue. Hosts are monitored by libtissue 
antigen and signal clients, which in turn provide input data to the artificial immune 
system algorithm, run on a libtissue server. Algorithms are able to change the state 
of the monitored hosts through response clients. 
 
libtissue has  a  client/server  architecture  pictured  in  Figure  1.1.  An  artificial 
immune  system  algorithm  is  implemented  as  part  of  a  libtissue server,  and 
libtissue clients provide input data to the algorithm and response mechanisms which 
change the state of the monitored system. This client/server architecture separates data 
collection by the libtissue clients from data processing by the libtissue servers 
and allows for relatively easy extensibility and testing of algorithms on new data sources. 
  
 
libtissue was coded  in C as a Linux  shared  library with client  and server  APIs, 
allowing new antigen and signal sources to be easily added to libtissue servers from a 
programmatic perspective. Because libtissue is implemented as a library, algorithms 
can  be  compiled  and  run  on  other  researchers’  machines  with  no  modification. 
Client/server communication is socket-based, allowing clients and servers to potentially 
run on separate machines, for example a signal or antigen client may in fact be a remote 
network monitor. 
 
Artificial immune system algorithms are implemented within a libtissue server as 
multiagent   systems   of  cells.  Cells  exist  within  an  environment,   called  a  tissue 
compartment,  along with  other cells, antigen  and signals.  The problem to which the 
algorithm is being applied is represented by libtissue as antigen and signals. Cells 
express various repertories of receptors and producers which allow them to interact with 
antigen and control other cells through signalling networks. libtissue allows data on 
implemented algorithms to be collected and logged, allowing for experimental analysis of 
the  system.  A  libtissue server  is  in  fact  several  threaded  processes  running 
asynchronously.   An   initialisation   routine   is   first   called   which   creates   a   tissue 
compartment  based on user-supplied parameters.  During initialisation a thread is also 
started to handle connections between the server and libtissue clients, and this thread 
itself starts a separate thread for each connected  client. After initialisation,  cells, the 
characteristics of which are specified by the user, are created and initialised, and the 
tissue compartment populated with these cells. Cells in the tissue compartment then cycle 
and input data is provided by connected libtissue clients. 
 
libtissue clients are of three types: antigen, signal and response. Antigen clients 
collect and transform data into antigen which are forwarded to a libtissue server. 
Currently,  a  systrace antigen  client  has  been  implemented  which  collects  process 
syscalls  using  systrace (systrace  homepage,  2007).  Signal  clients  monitor  system 
behaviour and provide an artificial immune system running on the tissue server with 
input signals. A process monitor signal client, which monitors a process and its children 
and records statistics such as CPU and memory usage, and a network signal client, which 
monitors network interface statistics such as bytes per second, have been implemented. 
Two  response  clients  have  been  implemented,  one  which  simply  logs  an  alert,  and 
another which allows an active response through the modification of a systrace syscall 
policy. All of these clients are designed to be used in realtime experiments and for data 
collection for offline experiments with tcreplay. 
 
The implementation is designed to allow varied artificial immune system algorithms 
to be evaluated on real-world, realtime systems and problems. When testing intrusion 
detection systems it is common to use preexisting datasets such as the Lincoln Labs 
dataset (Lincoln Labs DARPA Intrusion Detection Evaluation datasets, 2007). However, 
the project libtissue has been built for is focused on combining measurements from a 
number of different concurrent data sources. Preexisting datasets which contain all the 
necessary   sources   are   not   available.   Therefore,   to   facilitate   experimentation,   a 
libtissue replay client, called tcreplay, was also implemented. This client reads in 
log files gathered from previous realtime runs of antigen and signal clients. It also has the 
  
 
facility to read logfiles generated by strace (strace homepage, 2007) as an optional 
source of antigen in place of the systrace client. It then sends the information in these 
logs to a libtissue server. Variable replay rates are available, allowing data collected 
from a realtime session to be used to perform many experiments quickly. Having such a 
replay facility is important  in terms of reproducibility  of experiments.  In reality, the 
majority of experimental runs are scripts which take data and parameter files as input and 
run a tissue server and tcreplay client. 
 
VALIDATION  OF APPROACH 
We wanted to verify that useful algorithms could be implemented and applied to a real- 
world problem. This section reviews the details of this validation. It discusses how data 
on a process anomaly detection problem was generated. It then presents a simple anomaly 
detection algorithm which we have implemented to test the libtissue system. Results 
from an analysis of the behaviour and performance of the libtissue system and the 
algorithm  are  then  presented.  Lastly,  an  example  of  how  this  algorithm  and  the 
libtissue system can be used to detect anomalies in process behaviour is given. 
 
Dataset Generation 
In order to gather data for the process anomaly detection problem, a small experimental 
network with three hosts was set up. One host, the target, runs software, in this case a 
Redhat 6.2 server, with a number of vulnerabilities. The other two hosts act as clients 
which interact with the target machine, either attempting to exploit its vulnerabilities or 
simulating normal usage. Because the experimental network contains vulnerable hosts, 
access between it and the public campus network is tightly controlled. While minimal, 
this setup permits realistic network-based attack and normal usage scenarios to be played 
out. Physically, the network exists on a single Debian Linux host running two VMware 
guest operating systems. The host and guests are connected via a virtual VMware host- 
only network. This setup was chosen as it allows for relatively fast configuration and 
restoration of the experimental network when compared with one in which each host is a 
physically  separate  machine  connected  via  the  standard  network  infrastructure  of 
switches and so on. Redhat 6.2 was chosen because the default installation installs a 
number of programs with vulnerabilities (Redhat Linux 6.2 Security Advisories, 2002) 
and because many well-documented exploits are available for these vulnerabilities. Tests 
were carried out with the rpc.statd daemon (rpc.statd, 2007), which provides a status 
monitoring service to other NFS clients and servers. The default version of rpc.statd 
shipped with Redhat 6.2 has a format string vulnerability which allows a remote user to 
execute arbitrary code with root privileges on the server (Multiple Linux Vendor rpc.statd 
Remote Format String Vulnerability, 2000). An exploit, statdx2 (Bugtraq: statdx2 - 
Linux rpc.statd revisited, 2002), has been released which levers this vulnerability and, by 
default, injects shellcode which causes a remote root shell to be opened on the attacker’s 
machine, allowing unrestricted access to the server. This vulnerability has also been used 
in automated attacks such as the Ramen worm. 
In order to collect the data, that is process syscall information and appropriate context 
signals, the target system was instrumented. The Redhat nfslock init script was modified 
to start rpc.statd wrapped by strace (strace homepage, 2007), which logged all the 
  
 
syscalls made by rpc.statd and its children. At the same time, a specially written 
application called process_monitor was started which monitors a process and all of its 
child processes. At regular intervals, one tenth of a second in this case, it takes a snapshot 
of the process table which it then traverses, recording the process identifiers of all the 
processes which are children of the monitored process. The monitor then logs the current 
name of the monitored process, the total number of children including itself owned by the 
process, the total CPU usage of the process and its children, and the total memory usage 
of the process  and its children.  Pairs  of strace and process_monitor logs were 
collected on the instrumented target machine while rpc.statd was utilised in a number 
of different scenarios. These logs were then parsed to form a single tcreplay logfile for 
each of the scenarios.  An antigen  entry in the tcreplay log was created for every 
syscall recorded in the strace log. A signal entry was created for each recording of 
CPU usage in the process_monitor log. While the strace log actually contains much 
more information, the use of just the syscall number is more than sufficient for testing the 
example  algorithm  described  in  the  next  section.  It  would  be  expected  that  a  more 
complex algorithm would require additional complexity in both the antigen and range of 
signals it is provided with, such as the addition of information about syscall arguments, 
sequences of syscalls, or instruction pointer addresses. 
The monitored scenarios are divided into three groups based on whether the type of 
interaction with the rpc.statd server is a successful attack, a failed attack, or normal 
usage. Statistics for the datasets are given in Table 1.2. All the datasets followed a similar 
pattern.  The  data  was  generally  very  bursty  in  terms  of  syscalls  per  second,  with 
relatively long periods of no syscalls punctuated by bursts of up to 1102 syscalls per 
second  (success1).  All  datasets  contain  an  initial  one  second  burst  of  405  syscalls 
executed by rpc.statd during normal startup. Syscalls generated by rpc.statd at 
shutdown, a burst of between 17 and 29 syscalls caused by typing halt on the server, are 
also present  in  the normal  and  failure  datasets.  They are not  present  in  the success 
datasets as the rpc.statd process is replaced by a shell process during the exploit and 
so not able to go through normal shutdown. In both successful attacks there are three 
bursts of between 98 and 1102 syscalls. The user interaction on the resulting remote shell 
(typing exit) creates 5 syscalls. The unsuccessful attacks produced a single burst of 96 
and 62 syscalls  (failure1  and failure2  respectively).  The actions of the NFS client in 
normal2 result in a single burst of 16 syscalls. 
 
 
 
 
Table 1.2:  Statistics for the six datasets gathered. 
 
 
dataset total time total antigen max antigen rate 
success1 55 1739 1102 
success2 36 1743 790 
failure1 54 518 405 
failure2 68 495 405 
normal1 38 434 405 
normal2 104 450 405 
 
 
 
The twocell Algorithm 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.2:  The two different cell types implemented in twocell. 
 
The cells in twocell, shown in Figure 1.2, are of two types, labelled Type 1 and 
Type 2, and each type has different receptor and producer repertories, as well as different 
cell cycle callbacks. Type 1 cells are designed  to emulate two key characteristics  of 
biological APCs: antigen and signal processing. In order to process antigen, each Type 1 
cell is equipped with a number of antigen receptors and producers. A cytokine receptor 
allows Type 1 cells to respond to the value of a signal in the tissue compartment. Type 2 
cells emulate three of the characteristics of biological T cells: cellular binding, antigen 
matching, and antigen response. Each Type 2 cell has a number of cell receptors specific 
for  Type  1  cells,  VR  (variable-region)  receptors  to  match  antigen,  and  a  response 
producer which is triggered when antigen is matched. Type 2 cells also maintain one 
internal cytokine, an integer which is incremented every time a match between an antigen 
producer and VR receptor occurs. If the value of this cytokine is still zero, that is no 
match has occured, after a certain number of cycles, set by the cell_lifespan parameter, 
then the values of all of the VR receptor locks on the cell are randomised. 
 
A tissue compartment is created and populated with a number of Type 1 and 2 cells. 
Antigen and signals in the compartment  are set by libtissue clients based on the 
syscalls a process is making and its CPU usage. Type 1 and 2 cells have different cell 
cycle callbacks. Type 1 cells ingest antigen through their antigen receptors and present it 
on their antigen producers. The period for which the antigen is presented is determined 
by a signal read by a cytokine receptor on these cells, and so can be made dependant 
upon CPU usage. Type 2 cells attempt to bind with Type 1 cells via their cell receptors. If 
bound, VR receptors on these cells interact with antigen producers on the bound Type 1 
cell. If an exact match between a VR receptor lock and antigen producer key occurs, the 
response producer on Type 2 cells produces a response, in this case a log entry containing 
the value of the matched receptor. 
 
System Dynamics 
In experiments it is important to have a baseline with which to compare algorithmic 
performance. In terms of syscall policies such a baseline can be generated, and is here 
termed a naive policy. A naive syscall policy is generated for a process, such as 
rpc.statd, by recording the syscalls it makes under normal usage, as in the normal1 
  
 
and normal2 datasets. A permit policy statement is then created for all syscalls seen in the 
datasets. This baseline is not too unrealistic when compared to how current systems such 
as systrace automatically generate a policy. Similarly to a naive policy, one way in 
which twocell can be used to generate a syscall policy is by running it with normal 
usage data during a training phase. During the run, responses made by Type 2 cells are 
recorded. At the end of each run, a syscall policy is created by allowing only those 
syscalls  responded  to,  and  denying  all  others.  Since  interactions  in  libtissue are 
stochastic, looking at the average results over a number of runs helps to understand the 
behaviour of implemented algorithms. A script was written to start the twocell server 
and then after 10 seconds start the tcreplay client and replay a dataset in realtime. 
twocell was allowed to continue running for a further minute after replay had finished. 
This process was repeated 20 times for both the normal1 and normal2 datasets, yielding 
40 individual syscall policies. A single average twocell policy was then generated by 
allowing all syscalls which were permitted in any of the 40 individual policies. It was 
found  that  all  of  the  38  syscalls  that  were  permitted  in  the  naive  policy  were  also 
permitted in the average policy. 
 
 
 
 
Table 1.3:  The syscall policy generated by twocell for the normal2 dataset and the frequency of response for each syscall. 
 
 
syscall 
gettimeofday(78)
frequency
1
listen(304) 1
send(309) 1
select(142) 2
poll(168) 3
recvfrom(312) 8
fcntl(55) 9
fstat(108) 9
open(5) 22
close(6) 34
 
 
 
In  order  to  examine  more  closely  how  twocell responds,  a  single  run  of  the 
twocell algorithm was observed. Following the same general procedure as the previous 
experiment, twocell was run once with the normal2 dataset. The resulting policy is 
shown in Table 1.3, along with the frequencies with which the permitted syscalls were 
responded to. During the run, the time at which a Type 2 cell produced a response to a 
particular syscall was also recorded, and the rate at which these responses occured was 
calculated. This clearly showed a correlation between the rate of incoming syscalls and 
the  rate  of  responses  produced  by  Type  2  cells.  Cells  initially  do  not  produce  any 
response until syscalls occur, and then produce a burst of responses for a relatively short 
period before settling down to an unresponsive state once again. This is to be expected, as 
antigen (syscalls) enter and are passed through twocell until their eventual destruction 
after being presented on Type 1 cell antigen producers. 
 
 
 
Classification  Accuracy 
An example is now given of how the classification accuracy and error of a libtissue 
algorithm can be evaluated. In terms of syscall policies, a particular policy can be 
considered successful in relation to the number of normal syscalls it permits versus the 
number  of  attack  syscalls  it  denies.  The  naive  policy  and  average  twocell policy 
generated from datasets normal1 and normal2 in the experiment above were evaluated in 
such a way. The number of syscalls both policies permitted and denied when applied to 
the four datasets in the attack and failed attack groups was recorded. Syscalls within these 
groups were labelled as either generated by an attack or by normal usage.  For each 
dataset, Table 1.4  shows the percentages  of attack and normal syscalls in the dataset, 
together with the percentage of syscalls permitted by the naive and twocell policies. 
From the results, the tendency of the naive policy was to permit the vast majority of 
syscalls, whether attack related or not. The twocell-generated  policy behaved much 
more selectively, denying a slightly larger proportion of syscalls in the success1 and 
success2 datasets than it permitted. For the failure1 and failure2 dataset the converse was 
true. 
 
 
 
 
Table 1.4:  Comparison of the performance of a naive policy and a twocell policy generated from the normal2 dataset. 
 
 
dataset 
normal syscalls 
success1 
23% 
success2 
23% 
failure1 
81% 
failure2 
87% 
attack syscalls 76% 76% 18% 12% 
naive permit 90% 90% 99% 99% 
naive deny 9% 9% 0% 0% 
twocell permit 47% 47% 69% 68% 
twocell deny 52% 52% 30% 31% 
 
 
 
Discussion 
The  dataset,  algorithm  and experiments  presented  in this  section  show  how  a novel 
algorithm has been developed and applied using the libtissue system. Runs used on 
average around 1%, and never more than 3%, of the available CPU resources, showing 
that  it  is  computationally  viable  to  process  realtime  data  using  our  approach.  The 
collection  and  analysis  of  the  rpc.statd data  has  brought  to  light  the  potential 
usefulness of a number of novel data sources which can be use in conjuction with syscall 
information. The experiments we conducted compared an algorithm, twocell, 
implemented with libtissue,  to a baseline standard approach, and showed how the 
agents  in  twocell responded  in  different  ways  to  normal  and  attack  sessions.  By 
measuring the response of the agents, we use our algorithm to classify sessions as normal 
or attack. This experiment showed that the performance twocell is at least comparable 
to current approaches. 
More  widely,  the  validation  experiments  with  the  twocell algorithm  and  the 
rpc.statd dataset show the feasibility of using libtissue to implement  artificial 
immune  systems  as multiagent  systems  and apply them to real-world  problems.  The 
  
 
twocell algorithm  has  also  provided  a  necessary  stepping-stone  on  the  route  to 
developing more complex algorithms. We are preparing to publish results of experiments 
with an algorithm which is able to detect a number of novel attacks with a low false- 
positive rate. To evaluate this and other algorithms we have created a second dataset 
which contains a wider range of normal and attack usage that the rpc.statd dataset. 
The  new  dataset,  which  was  created  by monitoring  a wuftpd FTP  server,  contains 
syscalls and 13 different signals including CPU usage, memory usage, and socket and file 
usage statistics. 
In order to generate realistic normal usage of the wuftpd server, we recreated normal 
sessions seen on a production network on an instrumented experimental network much 
like the setup for the rpc.statd dataset. Data on real FTP client-server interaction can 
be readily obtained from network packet traces collected by network-based  monitors. 
Such packet traces are technically fairly easy to gather but, more importantly, traces are 
also already available publically, removing the need to gather this data altogether. Use of 
public datasets also contributes to the reproducibility of experiments. By reassembling 
network packets transmitted between client and server a sufficiently complete record of 
an FTP session can be reproduced. The dataset used (LBNL-FTP-PKT  dataset, 2003) 
contains all incoming anonymous FTP connections to public FTP servers at the Lawrence 
Berkeley National Laboratory over a ten-day period and is available from the Internet 
Traffic Archive (Internet Traffic Archive, 2007). The traces contain connections between 
320 distinct FTP servers and 5832 distinct clients and provide a rich source of normal 
usage sessions, and we initially used the traces for one FTP server over two days. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
In this chapter we have given a overview of biologically-inspired approaches to computer 
security,  in  particular  immune-inspired  approaches.  We  then  discussed  in  detail  an 
intrusion detection problem, process anomaly detection, and reviewed current research in 
this area. A system, libtissue, which we have built for implementing immune-inspired 
algorithms was then detailed, and the results of validation experiments using an artificial 
immune system implemented with libtissue and applied to process anomaly detection 
were presented and discussed. 
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KEYWORDS 
Artificial Immune System: A relatively new class of meta-heuristics that mimics aspects 
of the human immune system to solve computational problems. This method has shown 
particular promise for anomaly detection. Previous artificial immune systems have shown 
some  similarities  with  evolutionary  computation.  This  is  because  they  focus  on  the 
adaptive immune system. More recent approaches have combined this with aspects of the 
innate immune system to create a second generation of artificial immune systems. 
Adaptive Immune System: Central components of the adaptive immune system are T 
cells and B cells. The overall functionality of the adaptive immune system is to try and 
eliminate threats through antibodies, which have to be produced such that they match 
antigen. This is achieved in an evolutionary-like manner, with better and better matches 
being produced over a short period of time. The adaptive system remembers past threats 
and hence has the capability of responding faster to future similar events. 
Innate Immune System: Central components of the innate immune system are antigen 
presenting cells and in particular dendritic cells. Until recently, the innate system was 
viewed as less important than the adaptive system and its main function was seen as an 
information pre-processing unit. However, the latest immunological research shows that 
it is the innate system that actually controls the adaptive system. Above all, dendritic cells 
seem to be the key decision makers. 
T Cells: Created in the thymus (hence the ‘T’), these cells come in different subtypes. 
Cytotoxic T cells directly destroy infected cells. T helper cells are essential to activate 
other cells, e.g. B cells. T reg cells suppress inappropriate responses. 
Dendritic Cells: These belong to the class of antigen presenting cells. During their 
life, dendritic cells ingest antigen and redisplay it on their surface. In addition, dendritic 
cells mature differently depending on the context signals they are exposed to. Using these 
two mechanisms, these cells differentiate between dangerous and non-dangerous material 
and then activate T cells. 
Process Anomaly Detection: A method of detecting intrusions on computer systems. 
The aim is to detect misbehaving processes, as this could be a sign of an intrusions. The 
detection is based on syscalls, i.e. activities by the processes, and context signals, e.g. 
CPU load, memory usage or network activity. 
 
